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Over the past two decades the environment companies operate in has become 
increasingly complex, and the pace of change continues to accelerate.  With increased 
complexity, comes increased risk for high consequence/low probability events.  At the same 
time, society’s expectations for performance have never been higher.  Injuries to personnel, 
impacts to the environment, and disruptions in production will no longer be tolerated.  In other 
words, achieving excellence in safety and operations is both more important and more difficult 
than ever before.  Yet there are a select few High-Reliability Organizations (HROs), such as the 
U.S. Nuclear Navy, that have defied this trend.  Their culture and organizational practices allow 
them to consistently demonstrate extraordinary levels of excellence while operating in complex, 
high-risk environments.  This paper will examine how these HROs leverage management 





The world has changed dramatically over the past two decades.  Email, the Internet, and 
now social media have dramatically increased the interconnectedness of the world.  
Globalization has led to increased competition, forcing companies to expand product portfolios 
and design increasingly complex manufacturing processes and supply chains.  Government 
regulations have become progressively more active, forcing companies to create new 
organizations and processes to ensure compliance.  All of these changes have dramatically 
increased the complexity of the environment in which companies operate, and the pace of change 
continues to accelerate. 
Complex systems have several characteristics that make them especially susceptible to 
high consequence/low probability events.  First, complex systems have many interdependent 
inputs that do not act in linear or predictable ways.  Second, they have feedback loops that act to 
amplify reactions.  As these interdependent variables are amplified by feedback loops, complex 
systems often exhibit emerging properties causing them to behave in ways that are impossible to 
predict. 
Traditional approaches to risk management are not well suited to preventing the high 
consequence/low probability events that arise from complexity.  First, traditional approaches rest 
on the ability to predict potential failure modes and acting to prevent or mitigate the risks.  The 
emerging properties exhibited by complex systems make this virtually impossible.  Second, the 
amplifying feedback loops present in complex systems cause circumstances to change so fast 
there is not adequate time to identify the risk.  Finally, these events happen so infrequently, and 
with so little notice, there is not ample opportunity to study and learn from them. 
 Unfortunately, recent history is evidence of this trend.  High consequence/low 
probability events are becoming more and more frequent.  Disasters of the scale of BP’s 
Deepwater Horizon, Fukushima Daiichi, and the West fertilizer plant are becoming all too 
common.   
However, a select few organizations have been able to defy this trend.  These High 
Reliability Organizations (HROs) have been able to demonstrate extraordinary levels of 
performance even in highly complex operating environments.   
 
The United States Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program 
 
 The United States Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program is an outstanding example of a High 
Reliability Organization.  For more than 60 years the U.S. Nuclear Navy has operated more than 
150 mobile nuclear reactors onboard submarines and aircraft carriers in remote locations and 
under dynamic conditions.  They have crews with an average age of 22 years old, and those 
crews turn over every 3 years.  Despite these challenges, the Nuclear Navy has never had a 
release of radioactive material.  This is an astonishing record when compared to that of civilian 
nuclear reactors that are stationary, operated by more experienced employees, and not burdened 
with high personnel turnover.  This paper will examine three lessons from the U.S. Nuclear Navy 
that companies can apply to better manage increasing complexity and prevent high 
consequence/low probability events. 
 
Lesson 1: Safety is not a goal! 
 
 For the U.S. Nuclear Navy, safety is not a “goal” or a “priority”.  It is a mandate.  
Incident rates are not tracked and used as a means to measure performance.  Likewise, officers 
and sailors receive no compensation or bonus based on improvements in safety performance.  
This is because even one incident is truly considered unacceptable.  The reward for being safe is 
getting to go home to their family.  Behaving safely and performing tasks that eliminate hazards 
are prerequisites for continued service. 
 When leaders state they want a workplace free from incidents, but then track safety as a 
goal or declare it the #1 priority, they send conflicting messages to the organization.  Goals and 
priorities can change, especially in a complex operating environment.  If leaders truly want to 
build an organization that is incident free, they need to stop hedging their bets and declare zero 
incidents the only acceptable outcome. 
 
Lesson 2: Simplify your management system! 
 
A management system is simply the collection of processes and procedures a company 
uses to manage its operations in order to achieve a particular outcome. For instance, a safety 
management system is a collection of processes a company uses to ensure its operations are 
conducted safely. A compliance management system ensures that a company’s operations 
comply with applicable regulations. Unfortunately, many companies do not think very 
deliberately about their management systems.  As a result individual management systems grow 
organically over time to address multiple outcomes, often resulting in a complex, inefficient, and 
ineffective collection of overlapping and inconsistent processes and procedures. 
Management systems have seen prolific growth over the last several decades. The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) alone has issued more than a dozen 
management systems in which a company can be certified. These management systems include 
safety, environmental, compliance, risk, quality, and asset management. ISO is not alone in 
prescribing management systems. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
requires companies that deal with high hazard chemicals implement a chemical process safety 
management system. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommends implementation 
of an environmental management system.  In addition to these management systems, there are 
also continuous improvement methodologies such as Lean, Six Sigma, Total Quality 
Management, and Total Productive Maintenance that contain many of these same management 
system processes.   
Unfortunately, because most management systems today are designed to achieve a single 
outcome (safety, compliance, quality, etc.), many companies have fallen into the trap of 
implementing multiple management systems. What they have not realized is the vast majority of 
these systems contain exactly the same processes. For instance, most management systems 
require processes for setting goals and targets, identifying risks, implementing procedures, 
training employees, and conducting audits.  Implementing multiple management systems, each 
with its own unique way of performing these processes, results in significant non-value added 
complexity.   
In contrast, the U.S. Nuclear Navy does not implement separate management systems for 
safety, sustainability, reliability, and regulatory compliance.  Rather, it has a single management 
system to deliver all of those results.  For instance, there are not different processes for 
identifying safety, reliability, or environmental risks that arise from equipment failures.  By 
implementing a single management system, the U.S. Nuclear Navy reduces complexity and 
focuses the crew’s time and energy on performing tasks that mitigate risks and improve 
performance. 
 
Lesson 3: A different kind of culture is required! 
 
In the wake of World War II, then-Captain Hyman Rickover was the first to recognize the 
enormous potential of nuclear-powered submarines and surface ships.  He embarked on a quest 
to build the U.S. Nuclear Navy before there were commercial nuclear power plants on the 
drawing board.  As a consummate engineer, Rickover was keenly aware of the enormous 
technical challenges standing in his way—this would be the most technologically complex 
undertaking of its day. 
But Rickover’s real genius lay not in his understanding of the engineering challenges, but 
of the significant organizational challenges involved:  how do you put something as complex as a 
nuclear reactor on a boat, under the ocean, and operate it safely with a crew of young sailors?  
He recognized that doing so meant eschewing the traditional military culture that had existed for 
centuries:  follow orders, do what you are told, and don’t ask questions. 
Rickover knew that to achieve the U.S. Nuclear Navy’s dual objectives of continuity of 
power and reactor safety, his sailors would have to operate in a different way.  He would have to 
build a different culture, one founded upon what has come to be known within the Navy as the 
Pillars of the Program: Integrity, Level of Knowledge, Questioning Attitude, Formality and 




The U.S. Nuclear Navy is built on individual and organizational integrity, meaning 
individuals can be relied upon to do what they say, and to do what is right, whether or not 
someone is looking.  Individuals must be able to rely on each other and their word—among 
peers, from subordinates, and from supervisors, managers, and executives.  Knowing how people 
will behave and what they will do leads to a safer work environment, allows accurate planning, 
reduces waste, harmonizes activities, and drives higher productivity. Without Integrity, there is 
no reliability, there is no confidence, and there is no trust.  
 
Level of Knowledge  
 
The U.S. Nuclear Navy prizes organizational and individual knowledge; it continually 
seeks greater knowledge. Individuals must have sufficient knowledge to determine what the right 
thing is to do and how to do it. In a complex operating environment, this requires a Level of 
Knowledge that extends beyond their immediate work areas and beyond just knowing work 
procedures or where to find information. Sailors must understand the broader systems and 
environments they work in to a deep enough level that they can identify abnormal conditions and 
potential hazards, react effectively to unanticipated situations, and be able to back each other up.  
 
Questioning Attitude  
 
In the U.S. Nuclear Navy, sailors constantly ask themselves: What could go wrong? Has 
something changed? Am I sure things are as they seem? What do I not know? What might others 
be missing? This proactive questioning is critical to surfacing issues, learning, and backing 
others up. Having a Questioning Attitude does not come from a lack of trust of others or a belief 
that you or your fellow employees are ill-prepared to complete the task at hand. Rather, it comes 
from vigilance and a sense of chronic unease: a belief that there may be better ways of doing 







Recognizing they are entrusted with something larger than themselves, sailors respect 
their roles, follow procedures, act with professionalism, communicate and report information in 
exact, prescribed terms, and respect rules. They recognize they are part of an organization made 
up of other people, facilities, equipment, processes, and procedures that must work in concert. If 
something can be improved, they use the appropriate channels to formally make those changes; 
they do not develop “work-arounds.” They communicate with one another in a consistent, 
defined manner to ensure information is reliable and understood. They treat each other with 
respect and value the roles others play. They respect the facilities they work in and the 
equipment they use. Housekeeping is important as it represents respect for the facility, 
equipment, and other workers. When employees understand that they have a responsibility to 
others, they are mindful of the task at hand. 
 
Forceful Watch Team Backup 
 
The U.S. Nuclear Navy expects commitment from all sailors not only to themselves, but 
also to one another. The concept of Forceful Watch Team Backup is rooted in everyone’s 
understanding that they are part of something larger than themselves, they must work in concert 
to be effective, and that no one person is ever perfect. Recognizing the seriousness of the jobs 
that they do, everyone relies on one another to look beyond their own activity to back each other 
up and ensure that the team as a whole is doing the right thing, the right way, every time. They 
actively look for what a co-worker may have missed and expect others to do the same in return. 
They have the courage to step in—the courage to care. 
 
 Note that the 5 Pillars of the U.S. Nuclear Navy do not describe its “safety culture”.  
Much like its management system, the Nuclear Navy does not distinguish between a safety 
culture, quality culture, or reliability culture.  There is only one united culture rooted in the 5 
Pillars.  The U.S. Nuclear Navy recognizes that the values and behaviors necessary to achieve 
extraordinary performance across all operational measures is not different.  As is the case with 




Over the last several decades, the environment that companies operate in has become 
dramatically more complex.  As a result, companies are more susceptible to high 
consequence/low probability events than ever before.  There are a few high reliability 
organizations, like the U.S. Nuclear Navy, who have been able to reverse this trend.  Those 
organizations manage to achieve extraordinary performance even in a highly complex 
environment by treating safety as a mandate rather than a goal, implementing a single, simple 
management system, and creating a culture based on integrity, level of knowledge, questioning 
attitude, formality, and forceful watch team backup.    
 
